

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 NEA-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

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AEC-11 DRC-01 SAM-01 /177 W
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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6361

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4142

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHPAE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3412

E.O. 11652: GDS 12/31/82

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJ: DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING JUNE 14, 1974: AGENDA ITEM III,
RESTRICTED SESSION

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL; OTTAWA HOLD FOR SECSTATE PARTY AT NATOMIN

BEGIN SUMMARY. IN DPC RESTRICTED SESSION, ASD ELLSWORTH
DISCUSSED SEDEF VIEWS IN SEVERAL INTERRELATED AREAS: TARGETING
DOCTRINE, US CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, SOVIET STRATEGIC
R&D AND US HEDGES, AND EFFECTS ON SALT. MASON, UK, WELCOMED
NEW TARGETING DOCTRINE, COMMENTED ON DIFFICULTIES OF PROVIDING
ADQUATE DEFENSE AND HOPED THAT UK DEFENSE REVIEW WILL NOT
UNDULY DETRACT FROM NATO POSTURE. END SUMMARY.

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1. ASD ELLSWORTH BEGAN RESTRICTED SESSION BY EXPLAINING THAT
SECRETARY SCHLESINGER REGRETTED HIS INABILITY TO BE PRESENT
BECAUSE THE ABSENCE FROM THE US OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY
OF STATE PREVENTED HIM FROM BEING ABSENT FOR A LONGER PERIOD OF

TIME. MR. ELLSWORTH PRESENTED FOR THE RECORD SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S DPC INTERVENTION AND HIS NUCLEAR POLICY STATEMENT.

2. ELLSWORTH SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE SOME REMARKS THAT WOULD REFLECT DR. SCHLESINGER'S VIEWS. HE SAID OURS IS THE FIRST GENERATION TO BE REQUIRED TO THINK THROUGH THE RELATIONSHIP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCE AND TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. SUCH WEAPONS ARE NOT GOING TO BE DISINVENTED. ELLSWORTH SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS DR. SCHLESINGER'S VIEWS IN SEVERAL INTERRELATED AREAS: TARGETING DOCTRINE, US CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, SOVIET STRATEGIC R&D AND US HEDGES, AND EFFECTS ON SALT.

3. TARGETING DOCTRINE. ELLSWORTH CALLED ATTENTION TO ITEMS IN THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS AND SEDEF'S POSTURE STATEMENTS FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS PRESAGING THE TARGETING DOCTRINE AND SAID HE KNEW IT CAME AS NO SURPRISE TO THE DPC. HE EMPHASIZED THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SIZING OF THE FORCES AND TARGETING, SAYING THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL HARDWARE CHANGES ARE IMPLIED BY THE CHANGES IN TARGETING POLICY; IT IS A MATTER OF COMMAND AND CONTROL.

4. ELLSWORTH MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON TARGETING DOCTRINE:

A. OPTIONS UNDER DEVELOPMENT WILL SET LIMITS ON THE LEVEL, SCOPE, AND DURATION OF VIOLENCE THAT WILL BE CLEARLY AND CREDIBLY OBVIOUS TO THE ADVERSARY AND PROVIDE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY AND INCENTIVE TO RECONSIDER. THIS SENSE OF LIMITATION IS MARKEDLY DIFFERENT FROM MUTUAL ASSUMED DESTRUCTION.

B. WE HAVE AND WILL MAINTAIN THE ABILITY TO CONSERVE AND PROTECT SUFFICIENT FORCES TO SURVIVE ANY ATTACK THE ENEMY CAN MOUNT AND TO STRIKEBACK WITH UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE TO HIM.

C. WE WOULD IMPROVE THE INTIMATE LINKAGE WITH US AND ALLIED CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT
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CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO CONDUCT A STALWART CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS AND TO DETER THREATS BY NUCLEAR POWERS.

D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TARGETING DOCTRINE DOES NOT IMPLY AN ATTEMPT TO ACQUIRE A FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY; THIS IS NOT ACHIEVABLE GIVEN THE LARGE SURVIVABLE DIVERSIFIED SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY THAT EACH SIDE POSSESSES.

E. THESE CHANGES ARE CLEARLY SEPARABLE FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SYSTEMS WHICH WE ARE UNDERTAKING AS HEDGES AGAINST UNCERTAINTIES IN THE OUTCOME OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

5. ON IMPLICATIONS OF TARGETING CONCEPTS FOR THE ALLIANCE,
ELLSWORTH MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE OPTIONS STRENGTHEN COUPLING SINCE AN AGGRESSOR WILL
HAVE TO TAKE SERIOUSLY THE BOARD AND CREDIBLE RANGE OF NUCLEAR
RESPONSES SHORT OF A FULL-SCALE NUCLEAR ATTACK.

B. WESTERN EUROPE BENEFITS. THERE IS A SLIGHT LOSS IN SECURITY
FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENT TRADED FOR GREATER GAIN AND
SECURITY FOR WESTERN EUROPE.

C. THE OPTIONS DO NOT LOWER THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD. THE WIDER
RANGE OF NUCLEAR OPTIONS COMBINED WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCES
ACTUALLY STRETCH DETERRENCE OVER THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF RUKS.

D. THE TARGETING DOCTRINE RELATES WELL TO SACEUR'S COMMENDABLE
WORK ON SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT PLANS. THIS WORK AND NPG STUDIES
SHOULD CONTINUE.

6. US CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. ELLSWORTH REFERRED TO THE
DEFEAT BY A NARROW MARGIN OF THE MANSFIELD AMENDMENT. HE SAID
THIS WAS ONLY A RESPITE AND THAT IT HAD BEEN PRODUCED BY THE
HARD WORK ON CAPITOL HILL BY SECRETARY SCHLESINGER AND OTHER
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS WHO WERE ABLE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING
POINTS PRESUASIVELY TO THE CONGRESS:

A. THAT THROUGH VARIOUS MEANS, INCLUDING THE FRG OFFSET AGREE-
MENT AND ALLIED PROCUREMENT PLANS, THE REQUIREMENTS OF JACKSON-NUNN
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HAVE BEEN MET.

B. THAT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT BE UNDERMINDE.

C. THAT THE EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE MAKING AN EXCELLENT CONTRIBU-
TION TO CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE AND UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE OF
CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE IN AN ERA OF NUCLEAR PARITY.

D. THAT EUROPEANS WILL SUBMERGE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES TO CONTINUE
TO ACHIEVE A COHERENT AND STALWART CONVENTIONAL POSTURE.
ELLSWORTH SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE HARD CHOICES BUT CALLED FOR
SUCH ADVANCES AS MORE EFFICIENT USE OF OUR NATO AIR POWER IN
THE CENTRAL REGION THROUGH AN AAFCE HEADQUARTERS AT RAMSTEIN,
BETTER RECEPTION FACILITIES FOR US REINFORCEMENTS (HE SAID THE
US WOULD ERAMARK AN ADDITIONAL EIGHT TAC AIR SQUADRONS TO NATO),
A STRATEGIC GROUND RESERVE FOR SACEUR, AND A PROGRAM FOR ENHACED
POL STORAGE.

E. THAT AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS BOTH PERCIEVED THE LIMITS TO
DETENTE. ELLSWORTH SAID CONGRESS ACTED ON THE BASIS THAT DETENTE
RESTS ON A STRONG NATO AND THAT NO UNILATERAL CUTS WILL BE
MADE. ELLSWORTH POINTEDLY REMARKED THAT THE EFFECT OF THE DUTCH

WHITE PAPER WOULD BE TO ERODE THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION
IN VIENNA IF CHANGES WERE NOT MADE. IN GENERAL TERMS HE
STRONGLY QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF REDUCTIONS ENVISAGED BY THE
DUTCH AND THE UK AND WARNED OF US CONGRESSIONAL REACTION.

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6362

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4143

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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USNMR SHPAE

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CINCLANT

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7. SOVIET R&D AND US HEDGES. ELLSWORTH CALLED ATTENTION TO THE
SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OUTSIDE THE PARAMETERS OF SALT 1.
HE SAID IT WAS NO SURPRISE THAT SOVIETS HAD A MIRV BREAK
THROUGH BUT WHAT IS ASTONISHING IS THE BREDTH AND DEPTH OF
THEIR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, INCLUDING FOUR NEW ICBMS, TWO NEW
SUBMARINES, A NEW SUBMARINE MISSILE AND MRVS ON THE SS-6
MISSILE.

8. ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET PACE, HE MADE THE FOLLOWING
POINTS.:

A. IF THE SOVIETS DEPLOYED THE SS-17, 18 AND 19, THEIR THROW
WEIGHT WOULD INCREASE FROM THE CURRENT 6-7 MILLION POUNDS
TO 10-12 MILLION POUNDS.

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B. THROW WEIGHT IS THE CRITICAL ISSUE AS THE SOVIETS ACQUIRE TECHNOLOGY NOT NOW AVAILABLE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WILL DEPLOY SMALL WARHEADS BUT RATHER 7-8 THOUSAND RVS WITH ONE TO TWO MEGATON WARHEADS. IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO USE WARHEADS SIMILAR TO OUR POSSESSION, WHICH WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE, THEY COULD DEPLOY 23,000 RVS.

9. ELLSWORTH STRONGLY ENDORSED THE USG VIEWS AND ENUNCIATED BY SECRETARY SCHLESINGER THAT WE CANNOT TOLERATE A POTENTIAL THROW WEIGHT ADVANTAGE FOR THE SOVIETS OF UP TO SIX TO ONE. HE SAID WE ARE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE WITH THROW WEIGHT AND RVS AS CENTRAL MEASURE, HOPEFULLY THROUGH ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS BUT IF NECESSARY BY CONSTRUCTING NEW SYSTEMS TO KEEP PACE WITH THE SOVIETS.

10. ON US HEDGES, HE MENTIONED TWO CATEGORIES:

A. IMPROVEMENTS RELATED TO NEW TARGETING DOCTRINE. IMPROVEMENTS IN ACCURACY, ALTHOUGH NOT ESSENTIAL, WERE A USEFUL ADJUNCT TO ENHANCE HARD TARGET KILL CAPABILITIES. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY. HE SAID COMMAND AND CONTROL IMPROVEMENTS ARE ALSO NECESSARY.

B. IMPROVEMENTS WHICH BEAR ON SIZING OF US STRATEGIC FORCES, INCLUDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HEAVY ICBM, TRIDENT, NARWHAL AND B-1. HE EMPHASIZED OUR MIX WILL BE DRIVEN BY SOVIET ACTIONS.

11. EFFECTS ON SALT. ELLSWORTH REITERATED THAT THE NEW TARGETING DOCTRINE HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH SIZING OF THE FORCES. HE AGAIN PLEDGED THAT WE ARE FOR MAINTENANCE OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE MEASURED IN TERMS OF THROW WEIGHT AND REENTRY VEHICLES. HE WARNED THAT AS THE SOVIETS ACQUIRE MIRV TECHNOLOGY COUPLED WITH THEIR THROW WEIGHT ADVANTAGE, THEY COULD SURPASS THE PRESENT US RV ADVANTAGE BUT THAT THIS COULD TAKE PLACE ONLY IF WE FAIL TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SEVERAL-YEAR GRACE PERIOD PROVIDED BY SOVIET R&D CYCLES.

12. HE SAID THAT SECRETARY SCHLESINGER EXPECTS THAT CERTAIN ANCILLARY AGREEMENTS COULD BE REACHED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, BUT THAT THOSE WILL NOT GO TO CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF THE BALANCE SUCH AS THROW WEIGHT.

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13. ELLSWORTH CLOSED HIS PRESENTATION BY QUOTING WINSTON CHURCHILL'S FRONTISPIECE THEME TRIUMPH TRAGEDY: "HOW THE GREAT DEMOCRACIES TRIUMPHED TO RESUME THE FOLLIES WHICH HAD SO NEARLY COST THEM THEIR LIVES" HE HOPED THE DEMOCRACIES AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE OF HISTORY HAVE THE WISDOM TO AVOID THE MISTAKES OF THE PAST.

14. MASON, UK, WELCOMED NEW TARGETING DOCTRINE AND THOUGHT IT LOGICAL THAT SELECTIVITY AND PRECISION INCREASED AS WE MAKE

TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES. HE NOTED THAT CITY KILLING CAPABILITY IS STILL THERE, SHOULD IT BE REQUIRED. HE ADDED THAT MANSFIELD IS STILL THERE ALSO. HE SAID IN ALL OF OUR COUNTRIES WE WILL HAVE INCREASINGLY TO FACE MINORITY OPIONION WHICH WILL MAKE IT TOUGHER AS THE YEARS GO BY TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE DEFENSE. HE SAID THIS IS TRUE IN THE UK AND THE NETHERLANDS AND TO A DIFFERENT DEGREE IN ALL THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. HE SAID HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT MBFR AND WOULD BE VERY CAREFUL IN ELABORATING THE UK DEFENSE REVIEW NOT TO AFFECTADVERSELY NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA.

15. ON THE GENERALPROPOSITION OF BUDGET CUTTING HE MADE TWO POINTS:

A. WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL BECAUSE IF DEFENSE REDUCTION MOVEMENTS GATHERED MOMENTUM IN OUR COUNTIRES, WE WOULD IN FACT BE DOING THE SOVIET JOB FOR THEM.

B. BUT WE MUST BE CAREFUL THAT WE DON'T BECOME SO ECONOMICALLY SICK AS NATIONS THAT THE ANTI-DEFENSE FORCES GROW STRONGER. THIS IS THE PURPOSE, HE SAID, OF THE UK DEFENSE REVIEW AND HE HOPES IN THE END THAT REVIEW WILL NOT UNDULY DETRACT FROM NATO POSTURE.

16. COMMENT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ELLSWORTH WAS PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE DURING THE RESTRICTED SESSION. END COMMENT. MCAULIFFE

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